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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

1.

Were the identification procedures used by police

officers violative of Mr. Pacheco's due process rights?
2.

(A) Did the trial court err in allowing admission

into evidence of a mugshot of Mr. Pacheco?

(B)

Did the court err in

denying Mr. Pacheco's pretrial motion to suppress evidence of his
prior conviction of Attempted Burglary?
3.

Was the evidence insufficent to support convictions of

Burglary and Theft?
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TEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Fifth Amendment, United States Constitution
No person shall be held to answer for a
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or
in the Militia, when in actual service in time of
War or public danger; nor shall any person be
subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.
Fourteenth Amendment, United States Constitution (in part)
. . . nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Article I, Section 7, Constitution of Utah
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law.
Article I, Section 12, Constitution of Utah
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have
the right to appear and defend in person and by
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to
testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process
to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own
behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an
impartial jury of the county or district in which
the offense is alleged to have been committed and
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance
shall any accused person, before final judgment,

vii

be compelled to advance money or fees to secure
the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall
not be compelled to give evidence against himself;
a wife shall not be compelled to testify against
her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the
same offense.
TEXT OF STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. §77-35-19(c)
(c) No party may assign as error any portion
of the charge or omission therefrom unless he
objects thereto before the jury is instructed,
stating distinctly the matter to which he objects
and the ground of his objection. Notwithstanding
a party's failure to object, error may be assigned
to instructions in order to avoid a manifest
injustice.
TEXT OF RULES
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice,
confusion, or waste of time.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to prove conduct;
exceptions; other crimes.
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence
of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible
to prove the character of a person in order to
show that he acted in conformity therewith. It
may, however, be admissible for other purposes,
such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence
of mistake or accident.

viii

Rule 609.

Impeachment by evidence of conviction of crime.
General rule. For the purpose of attacking the
credibility of a witness, evidence that he has
been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if
elicited from him or established by public record
during cross-examination but only if the crime (1)
was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess
of one year under the law under which he was
convicted, and the court determines that the
probative value of admitting this evidence
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant,
or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement,
regardless of the punishment.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
Case No. 880281-CA
Priority No. 2

ROBERT PAUL PACHECO,
Defendant/Appellant.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for
Burglary, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§76-6-202 (1953 as amended), and Theft, a Class B misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-404 (1953 as amended), following a
jury trial held March 24-25, 1988, in the Third Judicial District
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable
David S. Young, Judge, presiding.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On April 7, 1987, at approximately 3:30 p.m., Josephine
Eward noticed a blue and white car drive up her street and park near
the front of her neighbors' home, located directly across the street
from her own home.

Mrs. Eward saw a male emerge from the vehicle

and go to the front door of the home of Ray and Katherine Welch
(T. 14). The male knocked several times on the door (T. 16).
Mrs. Eward described him as being thin and wearing a red, black and
blue plaid shirt (T. 17). Mrs. Eward watched this male through lace

curtains covering her front room window and testified that the lace
curtains were hard to see through (T. 17).
Mrs. Eward testified that when no one answered the door,
the male turned and ran down five stairs, jumped across the lawn,
jumped across a small cement retaining wall, ran to his car, and
then drove off really fast (T. 18-19, 22). She did not see the man
enter the house or ever return to the house (T. 21). Mrs. Eward was
later shown photographs of possible suspects and identified a young
man as the person she had seen at the Welch's door (T. 21).
Connie Luna, a neighbor who lived kitty-corner from the
Welches, testified that at approximately 3:30-4:00 p.m. on April 7,
1987, she came out on her porch to wait for her husband to return
from work and that she noticed a guy across the street walking
through the field next to the Welch home (T. 45-46).

Mrs. Luna

could only see him from the back but she observed him jump a five
foot high fence leading to the Welch home (T. 46). She believed
that he might be taking a short cut and thought nothing more about
it (T. 46-47).

She returned inside her home (T. 47).

A few moments later, she heard Ray Welch hollering, "Wait
or Hey y o u / and Mrs. Luna came out of her house (T. 47). She
observed a male running from across the street (T. 47). Mrs. Luna
yelled at the male; he looked at her and then drove off in a car
that he had parked near her driveway (T. 47).
Mrs. Luna said she was approximately twenty feet from the
male at the closest point and that he was wearing a red checked
shirt that looked like tweed material and beige pants (T. 51).
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Mrs. Luna testified that the car was blue and white and that the
license number was 988 AWL (T. 48-49).

A photograph of that vehicle

was later shown to Mrs. Luna, and she identified it as the car the
man had left in (T. 48-49).
Ray Welch testified that at approximately 4:00 p.m. on
April 7, 1987/ he took a break from working in his yard and went in
the back door of his home. While inside, he noticed a movement in
his kitchen; he looked closer and saw a man run past a small hallway
in his house (T. 36). He was eighteen to twenty feet away and
testified he did not get a good look at the man (T. 36). The man
ran through the dining room and out his front door (T. 36).
Mr. Welch said the man wore a sort of plaid shirt, but he was unsure
about the colors (T. 36-37).

The man ran out the door, jumped the

cement embankment in the front yard, ran fast down the street, got
into a blue and white car, and drove away (T. 37). Mr. Welch later
noticed that between four and fifty dollars ($4.00 and $50.00) were
missing from a wallet that was kept in a dresser drawer (T. 38).
Mr. Welch could not identify Mr. Robert Pacheco as the man who ran
from his home that day (T. 42).
Katherine Welch was working in her side yard when she
heard her husband yell.
run out her door.

She ran over to the fence and saw someone

She described the person as a slender male

wearing a red and white checkered shirt of a heavier material and
beige or tan colored pants (T. 26). Mrs. Welch only saw the man
from the back and not the face (T. 26). She said he moved rapidly,
ran fast, jumped off the cement bank, and ran to a blue and white
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car parked down the street (T. 29). She estimated the person's age
at somewhere between twenty-eight to thirty years old, not a
teenager, nor sixty years old, and maybe forty years old (T. 30).
She admitted to be bad at guessing ages, especially where she had
only seen him from the back; she thought him to be younger because
he moved so quickly (T. 30). He had run without a limp (T. 30).
Detective Paul LaMont, now retired but then of the Salt
Lake Police Department, was the follow-up investigator for the
burglary of the Welch home.

He ran a check on the license number of

the blue and white car that Mrs. Luna had given police officers,
finding Robert Paul Pacheco to be the registered owner; counsel
stipulated at trial that Mr. Pacheco was the registered owner of
that car (T. 75). Detective LaMont then obtained a driver's license
photograph of Mr. Pacheco (Exhibit 8-S); and with five other
driver's license photographs, the detective prepared a photospread
to show to Mrs. Luna (T. 77-78).

Mrs. Luna was unable to positively

identify any photograph as the man she had seen on April 7, 1987
(T. 62, 79). She did, however, tell the detective that the
photograph of Mr. Pacheco could be the person but she was not sure
(T. 62-63, 79). The detective told her that she pointed him out and
that he would find a better picture (T. 64). Several weeks later,
Detective LaMont returned to Mrs. Luna with a new photospread of six
mug shot photographs paperclipped in a folder marked, "'MUG1 SHOW-UP
FOLDER" (Exhibit 6-S) (T. 65). Robert Paul Pacheco was the only
individual repeated in both photospreads (T. 63, 65, 72, 86).
Moreover, before showing Mrs. Luna the second photospread, Detective
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LaMont informed her that the suspect was included in the photospread
(T. 72). Mrs. Luna did, in fact, select Mr. Pacheco's photograph
from the second photospread (T. 59).
Mrs. Luna admitted at trial that the second photospread
did not contain pictures of others who resembled Mr. Pacheco; she
stated that most of those in the photographs were younger and that
it is obvious that Mr. Pacheco is older (T. 66). Judge Young also
conceded that four of the photographs were of individuals much
younger than Mr. Pacheco (T. 94). Defense counsel objected to the
identification and to the admission into evidence of the exhibit,
claiming that mug shot photographs by nature were too prejudicial
(T. 92) and that none of the others in the photospread resembled
Mr. Pacheco (T. 92-95).

The trial court overruled the objection,

allowed the exhibit into evidence, and thereby permitted Mrs. Luna
to testify to her identification of Mr. Pacheco through the second
photospread (T. 94).
Detective LaMont utilized the second photospread
identification of Mr. Pacheco by Mrs. Luna to acquire both a search
warrant of Mr. Pacheco's residence and an arrest warrant for
Mr. Pacheco (T. 80). Both were executed on May 27, 1987 (T. 80).
Detective LaMont removed clothing from Mr. Pacheco's
residence consisting of several shirts and pants (T. 80-81).
the trial, Mrs. Luna identified a shirt and a pair of pants as
looking like the clothes worn by the burglar of the Welch home
(T. 55). Other clothing taken through the search warrant was
returned to Mr. Pacheco at trial (T. 95).
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During

Prior to trial, Mr. Pacheco moved to suppress evidence of
his prior convictions pursuant to Rule 609 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence (R. 37). That motion was apparently argued in chambers,
off the record, and presumably denied (see Point II, B, infra).
Mr. Pacheco testified in his own behalf and admitted a prior felony
conviction of Attempted Burglary in 1981 (T. 115).
The defense case at trial consisted of testimony by Joyce
Shiner and Ivy Pacheco, Mr. Pacheco's girlfriend of seven years and
his mother, respectively.

They both testified that Mr. Pacheco

suffered a broken ankle in 1984, which as of the date of trial, had
never returned to normal, causing him to limp and preventing him
from being able to run without falling down (T. 100-02, 112).
Medical reports were admitted into evidence which verified his ankle
surgery and medical treatment (Exhibits 10-D and 11-D) (T. 118-19).
Both testified that Troy Chancier, Robert Pacheco's son, was the
same size and build of Mr. Pacheco in April of 1987 and that they
are identical in appearance from the back (T. 103, 105, 110).
Robert Pacheco took the stand in his own behalf.

He

confirmed earlier testimony that he could not run because of his
ankle surgery in 1984 (T. 117). He denied burglarizing the Welch
home and taking the missing money (T. 116-119).

Mr. Pacheco, age

forty-two, testified that his son, Troy chancier, twenty-three years
old, had borrowed his car on April 7, 1987, from the morning until
around 5:00 p.m. (T. 116, 119, 121).
The case was submitted to the jury who returned
convictions on both counts, Burglary and Theft.

SUMMARY OP THE ARGUMENT

Police officers violated Mr. Pacheco's due process rights
when they used suggestive identification procedures such as
reinforcing an unsure identification of a witness, then repeating a
show-up utilizing mug shots where Mr. Pacheco's photograph was the
only one repeated, the officer told the witness that the suspect was
included, and others in the photospread did not resemble Mr. Pacheco.
Mr. Pacheco's constitutional rights of due process and a
fair trial were violated when a mug shot photograph of Mr. Pacheco
was admitted and published to the jury over objection and where
evidence of a prior conviction for Attempted Burglary was not
suppressed but allowed to reach the jurors.
Insufficient evidence existed to support the convictions
of Mr. Pacheco because the evidence presented at trial was not such
that a reasonable jury could have found Mr. Pacheco to have
committed the crimes as testified to by observing witnesses.

ARGUMENT

POINT I
IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES UTILIZED TO OBTAIN
IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY AGAINST MR. PACHECO
VIOLATED HIS CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED RIGHTS TO
DUE PROCESS.
Mr. Pacheco asserts that the identification procedures
utilized by Detective Paul LaMont in this case, under the totality
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of the circumstances, were violative of his due process rights
guaranteed him by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the Utah
Constitution.

Mr. Pacheco insists that the procedures utilized by

Detective LaMont were so suggestive that Connie Luna's
identification of him at trial was unreliable and constituted
manifest and prejudicial error.

Mr. Pacheco therefore urges this

Court to reverse the convictions which followed the irreparable
misidentification and remand his case for a trial consistent with
his due process safeguards intact.
In Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968), the
United States Supreme Court, addressing the issue of suggestive
show-ups, stated:
This danger [that the witness may make an
incorrect identification] will be increased if the
police display to the witness only the picture of
a single individual who generally resembles the
person he saw, or if they show him the pictures of
several persons among which the photograph of a
single such individual recurs or is in some way
emphasized. The chance of misidentification is
also heightened if the police indicate to the
witness that they have other evidence that one of
the persons pictured committed the crime.
Regardless of how the initial misidentification
comes about, the witness thereafter is apt to
retain in his memory the image of the photograph
rather than of the person actually seen, reducing
the trustworthiness of subsequent lineup or
courtroom identification.
390 U.S. at 383-84 (footnotes omitted).

The Court held that

"convictions based on eyewitness identification at trial following a
pretrial identification by photograph will be set aside on that
ground only if the photographic identification procedure was so
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impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial
likelihood of irreparable misidentif ication."

16_. at 384.

The Supreme Court of Utah has adopted the position taken
in Simmons adding:
[T]he circumstances of the individual case should
be scrutinized carefully by the trial court to see
whether in the identification procedures there was
anything done which should be regarded as so
suggestive or persuasive that there is a
reasonable likelihood that the identification was
not a genuine product of the knowledge and
recollection of the witness, but was something so
distorted or tainted that in fairness and justness
the guilt or innocence of an accused should not be
allowed to be tested thereby.
State v. Perry, 492 P.2d 1349, 1352 (Utah 1972).

The Supreme Court

of Utah has further recognized the necessity "to examine the
totality of the circumstances of an eyewitness identification to
determine whether the confrontation was so unnecessarily suggestive
and so conducive to mistaken identification as to result in a denial
of due process.

State v. Marsh, 652 P.2d 1329, 1331 (Utah 1982)

(citing Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969); and Stovall v.
Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967)).
Four different people momentarily observed the burglary
suspect on the afternoon of April 7, 1987. Three of those four,
Mr. and Mrs. Welch and Josephine Eward, only saw the suspect from
the back (T. 16, 25, 35). Mr. and Mrs. Welch could not identify
Mr. Pacheco as the man who burglarized their home (T. 25, 35);
however, they both believed the suspect to be a younger man because
of how quickly he had moved (T. 30, 37). Mrs. Eward did select a
young man from the photographs the police showed to her as the man
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she had seen at the Welches1 door, not Mr. Pacheco (T. 21).
Only Connie Luna identified Mr. Pacheco as the man she
observed on April 7, 1987. That identification/ however, was the
product of procedures which were so impermissibly suggestive as to
give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable
misidentification.

The procedures used by Officer LaMont so tainted

the identification process and were so suggestive that there is a
very substantial likelihood that the subsequent in-court
identifications of Mr. Pacheco were products of the police
photospread procedures rather than a recollection of the perpetrator
of the crime.
Officer LaMont utilized procedures in direct conflict
with the warnings of danger elucidated by the Supreme Court in
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. at 383-84.

Moreover, the

officer's actions closely paralleled the factual errors found
violative of due process strictures by the Supreme Court in
Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969).
Specifically, Officer LaMont prepared a photospread of
six suspects using driver's license photographs (T. 77-78).
Mrs. Luna could not give a positive identification although she did
state that Mr. Pacheco's photograph could be the person (T. 62-63,
79).

After several weeks, the officer returned with new

photographs; the new photographs were mug shot photographs and were
labeled as such (Exhibit 6-S) (T. 65). Mr. Pacheco was the only
person repeated in both photospreads (T. 63, 65, 72, 86).
Additionally, the photographs of four of the six individuals in the
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second photospread were years younger than Mr. Pacheco as attested
to by both Mrs. Luna and Judge Young (T. 66, 94). The other
photograph is of an individual more closely comparable to
Mr. Pacheco's age but who looks nothing like him and has a very
unique fu-manchu-style moustache (Exhibit 6-S, top left corner) (see
Addendum A for photocopy reproduction of Exhibit 6-S). Mrs. Luna
was also inappropriately guided in her identification when the
officer told her after the first uncertain identification that she
had pointed him out (T. 64) and prior to the second photospread that
the police believed the suspect was among the photographs (T. 72).
As the United States Supreme Court warned in Simmons, the
practices utilized by the officer herein were such to reduce the
trustworthiness of the identification itself and £ fortiori the
subsequent in-court identification.

Practically speaking,

Mr. Pacheco was the sole photograph presented during the second
photospread.

Literally speaking, Mr. Pacheco's photograph was the

only one emphasized in the second spread, not only because of who
the other pictures were but also because his was the only photograph
repeated from the first photospread.

The chance for

misidentification was further heightened because the police officer
suggested the person who committed the crime was contained in the
photospread.

Cf. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. at 383-84.

In Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969), the United
States Supreme Court found that police procedures used for
identification so undermined the reliability of the only eyewitness
identification of the accused that due process was violated; the
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suggestive elements utilized had made it all but inevitable that the
accused would be identified whether he was, in fact, the
perpetrator.

In Foster, the accused was placed in a lineup with two

others who were six or seven inches shorter than he; and he, not the
others, was forced to wear a leather jacket similar to that worn by
the robber.

A positive identification did not follow, however, and

a second lineup was held a week to ten days later.

The accused was

the only individual repeated from the first lineup and a positive
identification occurred.
In the instant case, the first photospread was not
preserved (T. 83-84) so any taint is uncertain.

It is not

unremarkable, however, that the photograph of Mr. Pacheco used in
the first photospread showed him wearing a plaid shirt
(Exhibit 8-S). Yet, Mrs. Luna was unable to make a positive
identification; she thought that the photograph of Mr. Pacheco could
be the man (T. 62-63, 79). The second photospread, also held a week
or two later, was at least as obvious as the Foster lineup.
officer indicated the suspect was included.

The

Also, as in Foster, the

photograph of Mr. Pacheco was the only photograph repeated (T. 65,
86).

As in Foster, the positive identification which followed was

no surprise.

As in Foster, this Court should find that the

procedures utilized for identification so undermined the reliability
of the only eyewitness identification of the accused that due
process was violated.

As the suggestive elements utilized made it

all but inevitable that Mr. Pacheco would be identified, manifest
and prejudicial error occurred and reversal is warranted.
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Rule 19(c), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; State v. Kazda, 545
P.2d 190 (Utah 1976).
A complete examination of the totality of the
circumstances surrounding Mrs. Luna's identification further
supports that her identification was not reliable.

The United

States Supreme Court, in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199 (1972),
categorized the central question of suggestive identification cases
as "whether under the 'totality of the circumstances' the
identification was reliable even though the confrontation was
suggestive."

To analyze this question, the Court laid out

appropriate factors for consideration to be:

(1) the opportunity of

the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, (2) the
witness' degree of attention, (3) the accuracy of the witness' prior
description of the criminal, (4) the level of certainty demonstrated
by the witness at the confrontation, and (5) the length of time
between the crime and the confrontation.

Id.

Applying these factors to the facts in this case, the
totality of the circumstances weigh heavily that Mrs. Luna's
testimony was unreliable and manifest error.

Mrs. Luna's

opportunity to view the criminal was quite limited.

She did see

him, from the back only, on his way to the Welch home; but her
degree of attention was insufficient as she thought nothing of his
behavior (T. 46-47).

Her degree of attention was heightened after

she heard her neighbor holler, but the criminal was running to his
car and got no closer than twenty feet (T. 51). It could only have
been but a brief second when she saw his face as he glanced at her
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while running (T. 47). Her attention was further directed from the
suspect when she focused on obtaining the license plate number of
the blue and white car (T. 49).
Mrs. Luna's prior description was inaccurate.

She

initially described the suspect as near twenty-five years of age
(T. 87); Mr. Pacheco is currently forty-two years old.

She

described the clothing as "a red checked shirt that looked like
tweed material and beige colored pants" (T. 51). That description
is quite generic; such clothing could be found in closets of most
homes.

In fact, police who executed the search warrant for clothing

from Mr. Pacheco's home took more than just two items because
nothing was so plainly identical to the description she had given
(T. 80-81).

At trial, she could only testify that from a garbage

bag of clothing presented to her, two of the items "looked like the
clothes he had on" (T. 55).
Mrs. Luna's level of certainty became much stronger as
the identification process wore on.

However, the suggestive nature

of that process utilized by Officer LaMont substantially diminishes
the value of this factor as it applied to this case.

Moreover, the

Utah Supreme Court has issued a recent opinion which discloses
inherent problems of eyewitness identification; among the problems
acknowledged by the Supreme Court is that "the accuracy of an
identification is, at times, inversely related to the confidence
with which it is made."

State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 490 (Utah

1986) (citing R. Buckhout, Eyewitness Testimony, 15 Jurimetrics J.
171, 184 (1975) (reprinted from 231 Scientific American 23 (Dec.
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1974))).

Mrs. Luna's pattern of identification fits within this

concern.

Accordingly, this factor should carry little, if any,

weight in the balancing.
Finally, the length of time between the crime and the
confrontation demonstrates that Mrs. Luna's belated identification
is suspect despite the suggestive and presumptuous process utilized
by police.

The offense occurred on April 7, 1987 (R. 96).

Mrs. Luna testified that about a week—possibly two days—after the
crime, she saw a photospread but could not make a positive
identification (T. 63-64, 79). Mrs. Luna testified that the second
photospread was shown to her a week or two later—maybe a month
(T. 64). Officer LaMont stated the second photospread and
subsequent identification occurred in the early part of May
(T. 79). So, in any event, at least two weeks had passed before a
positive identification was made.

Notably, as short as two days but

maybe a week after the offense, Mrs. Luna could not identify
Mr. Pacheco from his photospread.
thereby become suspect.

Subsequent identifications

The preliminary hearing identification was

made in late June (R. 04), the trial over a full year later.
On balance, the Biggers five factor analysis weighs
heavily that Mrs. Luna's identification of Mr. Robert Pacheco was
inherently unreliable.

Therefore, her testimony at trial

identifying him as the perpetrator was ill-based and improper and
served to support a very substantial likelihood of irreparable
misidentification.

Accordingly, Mr. Pacheco's state and federal due

process rights were violated mandating that this Court suppress the
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identification, reverse his convictions and remand the case to the
District Court for further proceedings.

POINT II
EVIDENCE INDICATING PRIOR CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR BY
MR. PACHECO ERRONEOUSLY REACHED THE JURY
PREJUDICING HIS RIGHT TO A FUNDAMENTALLY FAIR
TRIAL AS CONSTITUTIONALLY GUARANTEED.
A. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN
ADMITTING AND PUBLISHING TO THE JURY A MUG SHOT
SHOW-UP FOLDER CONTAINING A MUG SHOT OF
MR. PACHECO.
Police photographs or mug shots
have been around for well over a
half a century and prosecutors have
avoided using them as borne out by
the fact that Taylor is the only
Mississippi case that we can find
where they were introduced into
evidence. This case comes on the
heels of Taylor. We would point
out before the practice becomes
widespread, that the use of mug
shots except when absolutely
necessary, is inviting error.
Sloan v. State, 437 So.2d 16, 18
fn.2 (Miss. 1983).
At trial, the prosecution introduced a mug shot show-up
folder containing unedited mug shot photographs of Mr. Pacheco and
five others (Exhibit 6-S) (T. 60) (see Addendum A for photocopy of
Exhibit 6-S). Defense counsel immediately objected to both the
admission and publication of that evidence (T. 59, 92). The trial
court overruled counsel's objection and the mug shot show-up folder
reached the jurors (T. 70). Mr. Pacheco contends that the admission
and publication of his mug shot constitutes reversible error in that
it suggested prior criminal conduct by him, violating his due
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process rights as well as Utah evidentiary standards.
In a line of cases beginning in 1979, the Utah Supreme
Court has placed limitations on the admissibility of evidence which
establishes or implies other criminal conduct by the defendant.

See

e.g. State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 192 (Utah 1985); State v. McCumber,
622 P.2d 738 (Utah 1980); and State v. Gotfrey, 598 P.2d 1325 (Utah
1979).

The Court based these decisions on prohibitions within the

Rules of Evidence against the use of prior bad acts to prove
character as well as the due process safeguards guaranteed by both
the state and federal constitutions operating to secure a
fundamentally fair trial for every criminal defendant.

See e.g.

McCumber/ 722 P.2d at 356; State v. Tarafa, 720 P.2d 1368, 1370
(Utah 1986); and Saunders, 699 P.2d at 741-42.
In Saunders, 699 P.2d at 741, the Utah Supreme Court
noted the Rules of Evidence are designed to protect against undue
prejudice which would be caused by the jury's knowledge of a
defendant's other criminal acts.

One such rule, Rule 404(b) of the

Utah Rules of Evidence (1983), provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in
order to show that he acted in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for
other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
In State v.Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 496 (Utah 1988) (Zimmerman, J.,
concurring in the result, joined in part by Stewart, J., and
Durham, J.), Justice Zimmerman discussed the application of Rule
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404(b), as well as Rule 403, to evidence of other crimes.1

He

pointed out that the present Utah Rules of Evidence follow the
approach that evidence of prior crimes or bad character is
disfavored during the guilt phase of a trial.

Justice Zimmerman

further noted:
[Rule 404(b)] permits introduction of evidence of
prior crimes or bad acts to prove certain facts
relevant to pending charges, but only if the
evidence is admissible under rule 403, i.e., only
if the danger of unfair prejudice does not
outweigh the probative value of the evidence.
Id.

(footnote omitted).

Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence

provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
In State v. Holder, 694 P.2d 583 (Utah 1984), the Utah
Supreme Court reversed the defendant's conviction under Rule 45, the
predecessor to Rule 403, because the probative value of evidence of
a robbery which occurred twenty minutes prior to the incident
charged was substantially outweighed by the accompanying prejudicial
effect.

The Court pointed out:
The merely cumulative character of the robbery evidence
on the element of knowledge and intent regarding the
theft charge is significant because it highlights the
limited value this evidence has when weighed against the
substantial possibility that a jury would be prejudiced
by evidence of Holder's commission of another crime.

1

In State v. Bell, 92 Utah Adv. Rep. 22, 26, 30 n.22
(1988), the Court favorably noted this discussion by Justice
Zimmerman in State v. Bishop.
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.Id. at 584.
Article I, sections 7 and 12 of the Utah Constitution and
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution guarantee due process and a fair trial to a criminal
defendant.

In his concurrence in State v. Bishop, Justice Zimmerman

pointed out that "[1 language in some of our cases, such as State v.
Saunders and State v. Tarafa, plainly states that permitting the
jury to consider otherwise inadmissible bad character evidence for
the sole purpose of determining guilt denies a defendant due process
in violation of the state and federal constitutions.n

Bishop/ 753

P.2d at 497.
The inherently prejudicial nature of mug shot evidence
has the effect of suggesting to the jury that the defendant was
involved in prior criminal activity and outweighs any possible
probative value.

As a result, the admission and publication of such

evidence violates both Rules 403 and 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence
(1983), and the defendant's right to due process under both the
state and federal constitutions.
The issue of whether mug shots are inadmissible in a
criminal prosecution due to their prejudicial effect has never been
directly decided by this Court.2

In State v. Owens, 388 P.2d 797

(Utah 1964), the appellant claimed that the trial court erred in

2

The paucity of Utah case law dealing with this issue
despite the fact that mug shots are commonly utilized in criminal
law enforcement may be indicative of a consensus by trial judges and
prosecutors that such evidence is inherently prejudicial and
therefore rarely admitted in a criminal trial.
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admitting testimony concerning the use of mug shot photographs for
identification purposes.

In Owens, defense counsel did not object

to the admissibility of the mug shots, and the Court appeared to
rule on the admissibility of the witness1 prior identification
rather than the admissibility of the mug shots themselves,

icL at

797-98.
A careful reading of Owens, however, does not show the
Court condoning the use of mug shots nor determining their
admissibility under the predecessor to Rule 404(b).

Utah cases

citing Owens do not refer to it in regard to the admission of mug
shot photographs; instead, cases which cite Owens rely on its
holding that once a witness has identified a defendant at trial, the
evidence of prior identification may also be admissible.

See e.g.,

State v. Jiron, 492 P.2d 983 (Utah 1972).
In a more recent Utah case, State v. McCardell, 652 P.2d
942, 945 (Utah 1982), the appellant claimed that he was denied a
fair trial where the trial court admitted mug shots as evidence.
The Utah Supreme Court noted that "McCardell's arguments on this
point clearly have merit," but the Court did not address the issue
due to counsel's failure to make a specific objection.

J[c[. at 946.

Unlike Utah, other jurisdictions have examined the
appropriateness of mug shot photographs in the trial setting.

The

District of Columbia Circuit Court has addressed the universally
recognized characteristics of the mug shot and the accompanying
inference of criminal activity.

In Barnes v. U.S., 365 F.2d 509

(D.C. Cir. 1966), the court commented:

- 20 -

"The double-shot picture,

with front and profile shots alongside each other, is so familiar,
from 'wanted1 posters in the post office, motion pictures and
television, that the inference that the person involved has a
criminal record or has at least been in trouble with the police, is
natural, perhaps automatic."

Ici. at 510-11.

In accord, the Colorado Supreme Court has criticized the
use of mug shots even where they have been doctored to exclude the
information contained in the legend because they "necessarily import
prior criminality to the defendant. . . . "
P.2d 879 (Colo. 1973).

People v. Bugarin, 507

Similarly, the court in Blue v. State, 235

N.E.2d 471 (Ind. 1968), recognized the strong negative connotation
associated with the mug shot photograph:

"These photographs are

highly prejudicial upon sight and may very easily create an
unfavorable automatic reaction in a juror's mind without further
investigation by him."

235 N.E.2d at 474.

In State v. Kutzen, 620 P.2d 259 (Hawaii App. 1980), the
admission into evidence of photos consisting of double-shot frontal
and profile views of each defendant, with white paper folded and
stapled over the lower portion of the photos, constituted reversible
error where the State's entire case relied on the identification of
one eyewitness.

In State v. Moore, 495 P.2d 448 (Ariz. 1972), the

Arizona Supreme Court held that even the verbalization of the words
"mug shot" when referring to a photograph was reversible error as an
inference of prior criminal activity.

The Moore court further

approved a previous Arizona Court of Appeals decision which held as
prejudicial error the admission of a mug shot where the legend was
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removed but consisted of a double-shot frontal and profile photo.
State v. Cumbo, 451 P.2d 333 (Ariz. App. 1969).
In Johnson v. Commonwealth, 345 S.E.2d 303 (Va. App.
1986)/ the court surveyed various jurisdictions regarding the
instant issue.

It noted that a three-prong test utilized by the

court in United States v. Harrington, 490 F.2d 487 (2nd Cir. 1973),
seemed the most satisfactory approach and concluded that "[m]ost of
the federal and state courts that have had occasion to rule upon the
subject in recent years have commented upon [the Harrington]
standards with approval, and there has been virtually no criticism
of them."

Johnson, 345 S.E.2d at 307.

In Harrington, the court

enunciated the following three-prong test for the admissibility of
mug shots:
1) The Government must have a demonstrable need
to introduce the photographs* and
2) The photographs themselves, if shown to the
jury, must not imply that the defendant has a
prior criminal record; and
3) The manner of introduction at trial must be
such that it does not draw particular attention to
the source or implications of the photographs.
Harrington, 490 £n.2d at 495.

The Johnson court, after applying

Harrington's three-prong test, found reversible error where the
defendant's unexcised mug shot was admitted and published because of
the implication of a prior criminal record.
Applying the Harrington tripartite test to the instant
case yields a finding that the admissibility of the defendant's mug
shot is reversible error.

The first prong requiring a demonstrable

need for the introduction of the mug shot fails for a variety of
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reasons.

First/ the mug shots were introduced in the State's case

in chief, and as Wharton's criminal evidence treatise elucidates,
"When evidence of other crimes is offered in chief, it violates not
only the rule of policy which forbids the State initially to attack
the character of the accused, but also the rule that bad character
may not be shown by evidence of particular acts."

Wharton's

Criminal Evidence 13th ed. §240 at 535 (citations omitted).
Second, the only plausible demonstrable need profferable
by the State is that of identification under the rubric of the
identity exception of Rule 404(b).

Even assuming, arguendo, that

this argument is at all viable, the posture of Utah case law as
discussed supra illustrates that Rule 404(b) must also comply within
the boundaries of Rule 403. Case law discussed above rejects that
possibility.

Moreover, in Commonweath v. Trowery, 235 A.2d 171,

172-73 (Pa. Super. 1967), the court addressed this issue resolutely:
The Commonwealth argues that this evidence is not
adduced to show the commission of the particular
crime charged, but merely for the purpose of
identification, and therefore its admission does
not constitute reversible error. This argument
weakens rather than strengthens the Commonwealth's
case, for in a real sense evidence of prior crimes
may have probative value in proving the commission
of the crime charged, but is excluded because the
prejudice stemming from its introduction far
overshadows that value. In a case where the
evidence is introduced merely for the purpose of
identification, most of the probative value of the
evidence is lost while the prejudicial effect
remains undiminished.
Third, the mug shot was merely cumulative evidence.
Mrs. Luna had already identified Mr. Pacheco and an officer
testified that she had picked him from a photospread.
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Although this

identification is challenged jji toto in Point I of this brief, if
that identification is allowed, the use of the mug shots, at best,
was cumulative and inadmissible under Rule 403 on that basis as well
as the inherent prejudice already discussed.

This first factor of

Harrington balances to find that the trial court erred in admitting
the photographs.
The second and third factors similarly weigh that
prejudicial error occurred when the Court admitted the mug shots and
allowed them to be published to the jury.

As discussed, supra, in

the case law, a mug shot inherently suggests prior crimes or
criminal record.

In Harrington, the Court found reversible error

and that the photographs failed the second and third prongs because
the mug shots were inartfully masked.

Likewise, the Johnson court

found reversible error where the mug shot was admitted unexcised as
the legend would alert the jurors to the nature of the photograph
with the implication of prior criminal activity.
308.

345 S.E.2d at

See, also, State v. Tate, 341 S.E.2d 380 (S.C. 1986); and

Sloan v. State, 437 So.2d 16 (Miss. 1983).
In the instant case, an analysis would similarly warrant
reversal under Harrington, et. al.

The photospread was unmistakably

a mug shot, unexcised and highly prejudicial.

The exhibit was even

identified as a mug shot as the title read, "'MUG1 SHOW-UP FOLDER."
The profiles of each photograph were also attached and easily
visible with a simple removal of a paperclip—something the Court
expressed concern over but left unchanged (T. 60-61).

Both the

second and third factors of Harrington balance in favor of the need
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to reverse the trial court's error.
Admitting the mug shot folder into evidence and
publishing the same to the jury implied that the defendant was a bad
person and that he had prior convictions.

Because there is a

reasonable likelihood that the jury would have reached a different
conclusion absent the mug shot evidence, Mr. Pacheco's convictions
should be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.

B. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY
DENYING MR. PACHECO'S PRETRIAL MOTION TO SUPPRESS
EVIDENCE OF PRIOR CONVICTIONS.
Prior to trial, Mr. Pacheco moved to suppress evidence of
prior convictions under Rule 609 of the Utah Rules of Evidence
(R. 37). That motion was presumably denied.

No minute entry or

transcription reflects that denial, but discussion between the Court
and both counsel at sentencing reveals pretrial motions apparently
were dealt with off the record in chambers (T. 3-10).3

Despite the

denial of Mr. Pacheco's motion to suppress, Mr. Pacheco still
decided to testify at trial so that his story might be heard.
Therefore, in an effort to reduce the negative impact of the prior
conviction evidence on the jury, counsel for Mr. Pacheco took the
strategic position of introducing the prior convictions during the
defendant's direct testimony.

Mr. Pacheco thereby admitted a prior

3

This citation refers to the sentencing transcript.
Specifically, at page four of that transcript, counsel refers to a
motion brought by the State to introduce prior burglary involvements
and possible admissions by Mr. Pacecho that he denied having made.
That motion is also not supported by a minute entry record or
transcription.
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felony conviction in 1981 of Attempted Burglary (T. 115)* This
strategy was employed by counsel so that the shock value of prior
criminal conduct could be minimized and so that the defendant would
not be seen to be hiding something which then would be dramatically
uncovered during cross-examination.4
Mr. Pacheco was being tried on two charges. Burglary and
Theft.
seven

Allowing admittance of a prior Attempted Burglary conviction

years old violated Rule 609 and prejudiced Mr. Pacheco's right

to a fair trial.
Rule 609 of the Utah Rules of Evidence states in
pertinent part:
(a) General rule. For the purpose of
attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence

4

Mr. Pacheco acknowledges case precedent which implies a
waiver of the claim of error in denying the motion to not allow
impeachment by prior convictions if the prior conviction is brought
out on direct as opposed to cross-examination. However, Mr. Pacheco
contends that such cases are pre-Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38
(1984), cases, and because Luce and State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032
(Utah 1987), now require that a defendant must take the stand in his
own behalf to preserve a claim, those cases which imply a waiver
should be strongly resisted.
Policy considerations and fundamental fairness demand
that if the defendant must take the stand to preserve a claim for
appeal, counsel may employ a strategy to bring out the prior
convictions on direct examination. To do otherwise would grant
unwarranted advantage to the State. The jury would doubtfully
understand the legal technicality forbidding the defendant from
being completely truthful and honest with the jury about prior
convictions; and when such information was "uncovered" by the State
on cross-examination, the jury would subconsciously, if not
consciously, discount the credibility of the defendant. The jury
would infer from the defendant's conduct an intent on his part to
hide or hope to hide the information of prior convictions.
This Court should therefore not foreclose Mr. Pacheco's
appeal on this issue based on antiquated legal reasoning which
contradicts the defendant's desire to testify and deliver his story
to the jury who will determine his guilt or innocence.
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that he has been convicted of a crime shall be
admitted if elicited from him or established by
public record during cross-examination but only if
the crime (1) was punishable by death or
imprisonment in excess of one year under the law
under which he was convicted, and the court
determines that the probative value of admitting
this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to
the defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false
statement, regardless of the punishment.
Mr. Pacheco's prior felony for Attempted Burglary does not fit
within the rule as allowable impeachment evidence.

Subsection (1)

of Rule 609(a) allows admission of the prior conviction only after
the Court performs a balancing test of the probative value of the
evidence as against its prejudicial effect.

The Utah Supreme Court

and this Court have both addressed the (a)(1) question in recent
decisions.

See State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1986); State v.

Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1987); State v. Wight, Case No.
870558-CA (Utah App. 12/1/88).

Each case discusses the five factor

balancing test the trial court must utilize to determine
admissibility of the conviction.
An application of the Banner court's five factors to
Mr. Pacheco's case could only have found the evidence to have been
inadmissible.

Both Banner and Gentry support that the third factor,

the similarity of the prior crime to the crime charged, would be
dispositive of this issue.

In Banner, the Utah Supreme Court stated:

[I]t is particularly important when, as here, the
prior conviction is for the same type of crime
involved in the matter under present
consideration. In this type of situation, the
probative value of the evidence as effecting the
party's credibility will rarely outweigh the
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resulting confusion of the issues in dispute and
the prejudice to the party,
717 P.2d at 1334 n. 44 (emphasis in original) (citing Terry v. ZCMI,
605 P.2d 314, 325 (Utah 1979)).

In Banner, the prior convictions

were for Assault with Intent to Commit Rape and the current charges
were sexual in nature against a child victim.

The Court stated the

close relationship of the crimes would be "extremely prejudicial and
[would] tend to inflame the jury. . . ."

717 P.2d at 1335. In

Gentry, the Court found a prior conviction of Rape and a current
charge of Aggravated Sexual Assault to be "highly likely to
prejudice jurors and unduly influence their conclusion concerning
defendant's guilt."

747 P.2d at 1037.

In the instant case, Mr. Pacheco's prior crime was for
Attempted Burglary and Burglary was the current charge.

The prior

conviction evidence duplicating the current charge is even more
inflammatory than either Banner or Gentry with the resulting
prejudice requiring the trial court to exclude the prior conviction
under the (a)(1) theory.5

5

Although claiming the third factor to be dispositive,
Mr. Pacheco does not concede the others weigh against him. Rather,
Mr. Pacheco asserts that Attempted Burglary is not a crime which
affects character and veracity (factor 1). The fact the conviction
was seven years old also supports the need to have had it suppressed
(factor 2). See Banner at 1335, and Gentry at 1038, where
convictions of eight and nine-plus years, and five years,
respectively, were found too remote to have weighed in favor of
admission. This case hinged on identification and was absent of
nontestimonial evidence (factor 4) such that Mr. Pacheco's testimony
was too important to have been encumbered by prior convictions not
indicative of a propensity to not tell the truth (factor 5). On
balance, the other Banner factors also support the need to have
suppressed the conviction under the (a)(1) theory.
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Under the (a)(2) theory, the prior conviction of Attempted
Burglary could only have come in if Attempted Burglary is a crime of
dishonesty or false statement.

The Utah Supreme Court has not yet

authored an opinion on the definition of "crimes of dishonesty or
false statement" since adopting the new rules of evidence in 1983.^
This Court, however, very recently ruled that Robbery was not a
crime of dishonesty or false statement.

State v. Wight, Case No.

870558-CA at 9 (Utah App. 12/1/88).
Utah's Rule 609 is a verbatim replica of the federal rule,
and federal case law offers additional guidance to support that
Attempted Burglary is also not a crime of dishonesty or false
statement as meant by Rule 609(a)(2).
In United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348 (D.C. Cir. 1976),
which the Utah Supreme Court cited favorably in the 609(a)(1)
State v. Banner decision, the circuit court discussed in detail the
legislative history of Rule 609(a) pointing out the heated debate

6 This issue is currently before the Utah Supreme Court
in State v. Bruce, Case No. 860325 (argued February 8, 1988).
In State v. Cintron, 680 P.2d 33 (Utah 1984), the Court
issued a per curiam opinion concluding that theft impliedly involves
dishonesty. However, Cintron was decided under the old rules of
evidence, Rule 21, and that position is contrary to the current
direction and fresh start of the new rules. Moreover, Cintron is
unsupported and remains inconsistent with the purpose of the current
rules as well as case precedents. In State v. Banner, 717 P.2d at
1334 n.40, the Utah Supreme Court indicated that to the extent
previous opinions are inconsistent with the new direction taken by
the Utah Rules of Evidence, they should be overruled. Cintron is
old law and should play no role in the decision now before this
Court. The recent opinion from this Court in State v. Wight, Case
No. 870558-CA at p.7 n.2 (Utah App. 12/1/88), acknowledged that case
law predating the adoption of the new rules do not bind the Court's
interpretation for the fresh start of the new rules.
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which spawned the formulation of the rule.

That court quoted the

Conference Committee Report which stated:
By the phrase "dishonesty and false statement" the
Conference means crimes such as perjury or
subornation of perjury, false pretense, or any
fraud, embezzlement, or false pretense, or any
other offense in the nature of crimen falsi, the
commission of which involves some element of
deceit, untruthfulness, or falsification bearing on
the accused's propensity to testify truthfully.
United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d at 362 (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No.
93-1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in [1974] U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News, pp. 7098, 7103).

Footnote 26 of the Smith

opinion discussed in detail the history of crimen falsi concluding
that the crime of Attempted Burglary committed by Mr. Pacheco would
not qualify under the crimen falsi designation.

J[d. at 362-63.

Another opinion from the same circuit gave further light
on what Congress" intent was with regards to Rule 609(a)(2).

In a

statement from the Court in United States v. Millings, 535 F.2d 121
(D.C. Cir. 1976), which is also applicable to the prior Attempted
Burglary conviction of Mr. Pacheco, the Court reasoned:
Although it may be argued that any wilful
violation of law . . . evinces a lack of character
and a disregard for all legal duties, including
the obligations of an oath, Congress has not
accepted that expansive theory.
535 F.2d at 123.

The intent of Congress was to limit the

introduction of prior convictions for impeachment purposes only to
those crimes which bear directly on a witness1 propensity to not
tell the truth.

Otherwise, one could argue, as discounted in

Millings, that any crime could be introduced to impeach.

- 30 -

As the

Millings court unequivocally stated, Congress simply did not intend
to adopt such an expansive position.

The prior Attempted Burglary

conviction of Mr. Pacheco does not bear on his propensity to tell or
not tell the truth; they show no deceit or dishonesty as meant by
Congress •
in United States v. Glenn, 667 F.2d 1269 (9th

Cir.

1982), the court held that the crimes of Burglary and Grand Theft
were not admissible under Rule 609(a)(2) without a showing of
accompanying fraudulent or deceitful conduct.
the State to make such a showing.

The burden rests with

Generally, the court observed

that crimes of violence, theft crimes and crimes of stealth do not
involve "dishonesty or false statement" within the proper meaning of
Rule 609(a)(2).
Similarly, the Tenth Circuit has held that prior
convictions for second degree Burglary could not be used for
impeachment purposes under Rule 609(a)(2) because a prior Burglary
does not bear upon a witness1 propensity to testify truthfully.

The

court ruled that Burglary did not involve "dishonesty or false
statement" of the credibility-deteriorating quality contemplated by
Rule 609(a)(2).

United States v. Seamster, 568 F.2d 188 (10th Cir.

1978).
The only Utah opinion discussing whether Burglary is a
crime of dishonesty or false statement within the meaning of Rule
609(a)(2) is Judge Jackson's dissenting opinion in State v.
Morehouse, 748 P.2d 217, 222 n.2 '(Utah App. 1988) (Jackson, J.
Dissenting).

While the majority in Morehouse does not address the
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Rule 609(a)(2) issue, the dissent in footnote 2 adopts the
above-described line of cases and remains the only authoritative
discussion of the (a)(2) Burglary question by a Utah court,
Mr. Pacheco's prior conviction of Attempted Burglary was
not admissible under either theory of Rule 609.

The trial court's

error in denying Mr. Pacheco's motion to suppress his prior
conviction resulted in prejudice.

The appropriate standard for

review is whether "there was 'a reasonable likelihood of a more
favorable result for the defendant.'"
1038 (citations omitted).

State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d at

Because the Court permitted Mr. Pacheco

to be impeached through a nearly identical prior conviction, the
jury likely utilized that information rather than the evidence to
convict.

Absent that error, the outcome likely would have been more

favorable for Mr. Pacheco.

Accordingly, this Court should find

reversible error and remand this case for a new trial with the prior
conviction excluded.

POINT III
THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT TO
SUPPORT THE CONVICTIONS OF MR. PACHECO.
The standard employed for reviewing the sufficiency of
evidence and reversing a jury verdict is well established.

In

State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme
Court stated, n[N]ot withstanding the presumptions in favor of the
jury's decision this Court still has the right to review the
sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict."
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Further, the

Court noted:
We reverse a jury conviction for insufficient
evidence only when the evidence is sufficiently
inconclusive or inherently improbable that
reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the
crime for which he was convicted.
Id.

This standard restates the due process requirement which

prohibits a criminal conviction in any case except upon proof beyond
a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime
with which the defendant is charged.

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.

307 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
In Mr. Pacheco's case, all four witnesses who were
present at the scene testified that the perpetrator ran fast and
that he jumped over a cement retaining wall (T. 18-19, 22, 26, 29,
37, 47). Also, they each gave descriptions referring to the suspect
as young (T. 21, 30, 42, 87). Two witnesses, Mr. and Mrs. Welch,
never made an identification.

One witness, Mrs. Eward, did identify

a young man from a police photospread (T. 21), and Mrs. Luna, who
was the only eyewitness to make an identification of Mr. Pacheco,
originally described the culprit to be twenty-five years old
(T. 87). She also failed to positively identify Mr. Pacheco as the
burglar from a photospread within a week of the crime (T. 62-63, 79).
Mr. Pacheco is forty-two years old (T. 113). He denied
committing the Burglary and Theft charges against him, asserting to
have loaned his blue and white car to his son, Troy Allen Chancier,
age twenty-three, on the day that this crime occurred (T. 116,
124).

Testimony was introduced by the defense that Troy Chancier
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and Mr. Pacheco are of similar size and description (T. 103, 110).
More importantly, Mr. Pacheco, his girlfriend and his
mother each testified that Mr. Pacheco is incapable of running due
to ankle surgery he underwent in 1984 (T. 100-02, 112, 117).
Medical reports substantiated those claims and were introduced and
supplied to the jury (Exhibits D-10 and D-ll (T. 114, 119).
Mr. Pacheco's medical reports substantiated doctor care for surgery
in 1984, which required a pin placement, and rheumatoid arthritis in
his ankle and his hand.
Inasmuch as the State conceded in closing argument that
this case hinged on the sole issue of identification (T. 134),
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that
Mr. Pacheco, a man of forty-two years of age who could not run (let
alone run fast or jump over a cement bank), was the young man who
committed the Welch burglary.
Accordingly, this Court has the right to review the
evidence, find it to be insufficient to support the verdict, and
reverse the convictions of Mr. Pacheco.

CONCLUSION
For any or all of the foregoing reasons, the Appellant,
Mr. Robert Pacheco, requests this Court to reverse his convictions
of Burglary and Theft and remand this case with an order either for
a new trial absent the errors herein or a dismissal of the charges.
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